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Background: Recent meta-analyses suggest that several psychological therapies are 
increasingly but equally effective for treating a variety of personality disorders (PDs), which 
suggests the involvement of some common mechanism across both disorders and therapies. 
Psychological therapies for PDs all have a component that facilitates social learning, 
suggesting that part of the causation of persistent disorders may be an inability to modify 
current representations in the face of new knowledge. 
Objectives: The developmental concepts of mentalizing and the linked concept of epistemic 
trust may offer a hypothetical framework for explaining persistence and change in these 
conditions. 
Methods: The concept of epistemic trust is reviewed developmentally and in the context of 
the phenomenology of PDs. Some recent statistical models of the hierarchical structure of 
mental disorder are examined in relation to the hypothesized association with epistemic 
hypervigilance and shortcomings in mentalizing processes. 
Findings: Preliminary findings indicate an association between limitations of mentalizing 
and general psychopathology. Further direct and indirect evidence suggests links between 
epistemic vigilance and hypervigilance and a range of problems normally considered under 
the heading of PD. 
Conclusions: It is argued that persistent mental disorders are best understood not in terms of 
specific pathologies but in the framework of salutogenesis. Individuals with persistent mental 
disorder may lack a capacity for wrapping an adaptation for changing social conditions 
because some optimal social networks weaken by epistemic hypervigilance. 
 
